Title: Labor Union and Disclosure: Theory and Environmental Evidence
Speaker: 于止戈（厦门大学）
Time: Wednesday, April 8, 2026, 14:00-16:00
Venue：Gewu Building, Room 315
Abstract: This paper examines how labor unions shape the composition of firms' financial and non-financial disclosures. We develop a three-period framework in which, following unionization, managers allocate disclosures across financial, environmental, and social dimensions before formal wage renegotiation, shaping the pre-bargaining information environment, while unions later bargain using accumulated information. Greater union bargaining power increases the role of financial transparency in wage determination, leading firms to shift disclosures toward financial information and away from environmental disclosure. Using union-election outcomes and AI-generated disclosure measures, a regression discontinuity design shows that union victories reduce environmental disclosures and increase financial disclosures in the post-union period, with limited effects on social disclosure. These effects are stronger with greater union power or financial slack and weaker under heightened public scrutiny or strong capital market reactions.
